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We show that local house prices may be driven almost entirely by the demands of 
one identifiable group for several years and then by demands of another group at other 
times. We present evidence that house prices in Hawaii were subject to such regime 
shifts. Prices responded to demands associated with U.S. incomes and wealth for most 
years from 1975 through 2008. For about a decade starting in the middle of the 1980s, 
after the Japanese yen appreciated dramatically and Japanese housing and stock market 
wealth soared, however, house prices in Hawaii responded to Japanese incomes and 
wealth. Estimated models with these regime shifts outperformed conventional, constant-
coefficient models. The regime-shifting model helps explain why, when, and by how 
much the volatility and the elasticities of house prices in Hawaii with respect to the 
incomes and wealth of the U.S. and Japan varied over time. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
We investigate the oft-made observations of real estate professionals that, in some 
places and times, house prices appear to be driven largely by the demands of one 
identifiable group of buyers, whose effects on prices often arise abruptly, prevail for a 
time, and then vanish.
1  Our study provides evidence that house prices in Hawaii over 
recent decades fit that pattern. 
We find that a regime-shifting model, which estimates for each year whether U.S. 
demands or Japanese demands but not both, better accounts for house prices in Hawaii 
than does a conventional model, which imposes constant coefficients on U.S. and on 
Japanese demands. Estimates of the regime-shifting model imply that only U.S. demands 
affected house prices in Hawaii during the years 1975-2008, except for the Japanese 
“regime”, which we estimated to run from the mid-1980s through the mid-1990s. 
Because the market reflected only Japanese demands then, prices were driven by 
Japanese incomes and wealth and their associated elasticities. During the Japanese 
regime, the implied effects of U.S. incomes, wealth, and elasticities on house prices in 
Hawaii were zero. In the U.S. regime, the roles were reversed: Prices were driven by U.S. 
demand to the virtual exclusion of effects of Japanese demand. 
Why might the effects on house prices of one group’s demands rise and fall so far 
so fast? If houses can be regarded, in effect, as being sold via auctions, then their sales 
prices reflect the demands of the highest bidders, but not the demands of the lower 
bidders. When enough of the winning bidders come from one identifiable (the “first”) 
group for a time, house prices are in a “regime” where only the first group’s demands 
affect prices. The winning bids from the first group will affect the sales prices of many   4
houses directly. Because of the partial substitutability of houses, the higher demands of 
the first group can also indirectly raise the sales prices of many other houses, which are 
purchased by those in the second group and by Hawaiians.
2 
While in the first group’s regime, prices change commensurately with the first 
group’s incomes, wealth, elasticities, and any other variables that affect their demands. If 
the second group’s incomes and wealth rise sufficiently, then the second group’s share of 
winning bids can rise dramatically. So can its effects on prices. After shifting to a regime 
dominated by the second group, prices will be determined by the wealth and other 
determinants of demand and the elasticities of this other group. As a market shifts to the 
second regime, the effects of the first group’s demands on prices shift to zero. Regime 
shifts then can be a source of time-varying effects or coefficients. 
After a market shifts regimes, prices then (but not before the regime shift) reflect 
the demands of the group who became the highest bidders. In the new regime, demands 
from the group that formerly had the highest bidders no longer affect prices. That is, the 
effects on prices, or coefficients, of demand of one group rise abruptly and the 
coefficients of the other group fall abruptly. 
Regime shifts can also be a source of time-varying volatility of prices (and other 
variables) and of the volatility of their unaccounted-for movements. The volatility of 
prices depends on the interaction of the volatility of demand determinants with their 
associated elasticities. The volatilities of the determinants of demands may differ 
considerably across groups. For example, the wealth of one group may be more volatile 
than that of the other group. In addition, demand elasticities may differ by group. 
Responses of demand to changes in incomes and interest rates, for example, may be   5
smaller for a higher-saving group. Regime shifts then can translate into time-varying 
variances of prices and of any other endogenous variables. Differences across groups in 
measured determinants are likely to be complemented by differences in unmeasured 
determinants. If so, then regime shifts can also produce heteroskedasticity in the 
unaccounted-for movements of prices and other variables. Thus, regime shifts imply that 
neither coefficients nor volatilities will be constant over time. 
This article is organized as follows.  In Section II we sketch out an auction-based 
model of house prices with two groups of bidders. Our model explains how a group’s 
share of the sales of houses can fluctuate dramatically, even when its relative income or 
wealth changes only moderately. Section III discusses some of the special features of 
Hawaii. In Section IV, we present a constant-coefficient, reduced-form model of house 
prices in Hawaii that serves as benchmark. Section V describes the selection and 
construction of the variables that we used. Section VI presents estimates of several 
specifications of the benchmark model, which imposes weights on the demands from the 
U.S. and from Japan that do not vary over time. We demonstrate in Section VII that, 
despite their successes, the benchmark models generally exhibit considerable coefficient 
instability. 
Section VIII explains how we estimated our regime-shifting model. By various 
criteria, we show that the estimated regime-shifting model significantly outperforms the 
benchmark model. In Section IX, we summarize our findings and argue that regime shifts 
might account for effects and volatilities in other times and in other markets that are time-
varying. 
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II.  Determining House Prices via Auctions 
This section begins by describing briefly features of the demand for and supply of 
houses in Hawaii that led us to use an auction-based model to explain their prices. We 
consider the effects on prices of the demands from two groups of potential bidders. Our 
model implies that the share of houses sold to the first group rises highly nonlinearly with 
the relative demand of the first group. The model shows that the share can rise 
dramatically (or negligibly) when the first group’s demand, relative to that of the second 
group, rises only moderately. The model further implies the marginal effect of the first 
group’s demand on prices is proportional to its market share. Thus, the effect of, and 
regression coefficient on, each group’s demand varies nonlinearly with its demand 
relative to the demand of the other group. 
 
Uncertainties and Auctions 
The market for houses in Hawaii has some features of auction markets and has, 
perhaps, more similarities than most markets for houses. Individual houses in Hawaii 
(and elsewhere) are indivisible goods and have only imperfect substitutes. In that regard, 
they are like objects of fine art, but are unlike a barrel of oil or a bushel of wheat, each of 
which have prices that are not posted but that are essentially determined by auctions. In 
many auctions, supply is predetermined. As we detail below, the supply of houses in 
Hawaii is severely constrained both by nature and by man. 
Given who buys houses in Hawaii, we contend that bidders from the U.S. and 
from Japan for houses in Hawaii have relatively large incomes and wealth and have large 
income and wealth elasticities of demand. We observe that owners and even visitors to   7
Hawaii are skewed toward higher incomes and wealth. Later, we provide some evidence 
that elasticities of demand with respect to income and wealth are quite high. It would 
generally be uncontroversial to use a house in Hawaii as an example of a “luxury good.” 
Households with higher incomes, in part because of their high effective correlations with 
capital market incomes, may well also have more volatile and more uncertain incomes 
and wealth.
3 
The combination of uncertain incomes and wealth over time and large elasticities 
can make individual demands for houses in Hawaii quite uncertain over time. Another 
source of demand uncertainty likely stems from the incomes, wealth, and availability of 
imperfectly-substitutable alternative (vacation) houses of offshore bidders being heavily 
dependent on the (mainland) U.S. and on the Japanese economies, which are very distant 
and very different from the economy of Hawaii. Coupled with the low elasticity of 
supply, uncertain (i.e., unpredictable) demands can create significant uncertainties about 
the market clearing prices of houses, and especially of individual houses. One way that 
markets sometimes resolve significant uncertainties about market-clearing prices is to 
conduct auctions. Thus, we regard there being good reasons for houses to be sold as if by 
auctions and we regard (sealed-bid) auctions as satisfactory approximations to the actual 
sales mechanisms for houses in Hawaii. 
We assume that there are enough bidders to rule out effective price collusion. We 
assume that bidders are all equally well informed. We assume that, for each house, each 
bidder has a reservation value, which is the maximum amount that bidder is willing to 
pay for that house. The maximum amount depends on the bidder’s preferences for the 
attributes of each house and the bidder’s ability to pay. We take the bidder’s income or   8
wealth to indicate ability to pay. Because bidders differ by preferences and by ability to 
pay, reservation values differ by bidder. 
 
Bidding, Prices, and Market Shares 
The optimal strategy in sealed-bid auctions with sufficient, equally-informed 
bidders is to bid one’s reservation value.
4 To simplify our model, we assume that each 
bidder j (from the US or Japan, as denoted by the US and JP superscripts) has Cobb-
Douglas preferences. We denote the number of bidders from the U.S. as J
US; the number 
of bidders from Japan is J
JP. Cobb-Douglas preferences imply that each bidder has a 
reservation value for each house at each time t, RVijt, that is proportional to the bidder’s 
wealth at time t, Wjt:  
(1)     and  . US US US JP JP JP ij t ij j t ij t ij j t RV W RV W h h = =  
For each bidder, that proportion,  ij h , varies across houses due to differences across 
houses in their attributes, but does not vary over time. For a particular house, that 
proportion,  ij h , also varies across bidders due to differences in their preferences. 
Each seller is uncertain about, Pit, the eventual sales price. Uncertainty about Pit 
can result from sellers’ uncertainties about (1) how many people from each country, J
US 
and J
JP will bid, (2) what the values of the proportions,  ij h , are for each bidder for each 
house, and (3) what the bidders’ individual wealth, Wjt, is. As noted above, such 
uncertainties often lead to auctions.  
Eventually, each house i will be sold at time t to the highest bidder at a price, Pit, 
regardless of which country (the U.S. or Japan) the bidder comes from:   9
(2)    1 1 max[ ,..., , ,..., ]. US JP it i t i t iJ t iJ t P RV RV RV RV =  
The probability, sit, that the maximum bid is made by a Japanese bidder is: 
(3)    ( ) 1 1 Pr max[ ,..., ] max[ ,..., ] . JP US it i t i t iJ t iJ t s RV RV RV RV = >  
Equations (2) and (3) imply that the expected sales price for house i is given by 
equation (4), which weights the expected maximum bid from each country by the 
probability that bid would be the winning bid:
5 
(4)    1 1 ( ) (1 )max[ ,..., ] max[ ,..., ]. US JP it it i t it i t iJ t iJ t E P s RV RV s RV RV = - +  
  We assume that the expected maximum bid from each country at any time can be 
reasonably approximated by a linear function of that country’s wealth. The stronger the 
preferences for houses in Hawaii, the larger we would expect the coefficients in equation 
(5).  Then, for Japan, and analogously for the U.S., the expected maximum bid is given 
by: 
(5)    ( ) 1 0 1 max[ ,..., ] JP
JP JP JP
i t t iJ t E RV RV W a a » +        
where 
JP
t W is the national wealth of Japan. 
The actual prices of houses sold at any time differ from their expected prices 
because the actual winning bids can differ from the expected winning bids implied by 
equation (5). We can collect the difference between the actual and expected price of a 
house into a disturbance term, eit, as shown in equation (6): 
(6)    ( ) . it it it P E P e = +  
  The actual and expected price of house i inevitably differ because equation (5), 
which contains only one national indicator, does not include all of the factors that affect 
the expected winning bids.  Differences also arise because equation (5) omits any   10
information that is specific to house i or that pertains to individual bidders in the two 
countries. As a result, the disturbance term, eit, is a composite of the omitted effects 
associated with either country. The variance of eit then also would incorporate the 
variance of the omitted effects from each country. 
Substituting equation (5) from the U.S. and Japan and equation (4) into equation 
(6) and averaging over the I houses sold during time t produces the equation for the 
average price of houses: 
(7)    ( ) 0 1 0 1
1 1
(1 )( ) ( ) .
US US US JP JP JP
it it t it t it
i i
P s W s W e
I I
a a a a = - + + + + ∑ ∑  
We denote the average price from equation (7) as Pt and the average during time t of eit as 
et.
6  We interpret st, the average over I of the probabilities that the highest bidder is 
Japanese, as the Japanese share of purchases. Equation (8) shows that the average price 
depends on the Japanese share of purchases and the wealth of the U.S. and of Japan: 
(8)    0 1 0 1 (1 )( ) ( ) .
US US US JP JP JP
t t t t t t P s W s W e a a a a = - + + + +  
Equation (8) shows that the effect of a country’s wealth on the average price at 
any time t varies positively with the strength of that country’s preferences for houses in 
Hawaii and with its share of purchases. Equation (8) also shows that a rise in the 
Japanese share, st, reduces the effect of U.S. wealth at the same time that it raises the 
effect of Japanese wealth, and vice versa. Next we show how the distribution of 
preferences and shifts in the relative wealth of two countries interact. In particular, we 
show that the effect of, or coefficient on, a country’s wealth can shift dramatically, even 
if relative wealth changes only moderately. 
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Skewness of Reservation Values  
Figure 1 shows distributions of reservation values within a country that are 
skewed to the right. There we depict reservation values that are distributed as chi-
squares. The solid line shows a chi-square distribution that has a mean equal to 5; the 
dashed line shows a chi-square distribution that has a mean equal to 7, which implies a 
more skewed distribution. The vertical line is drawn at a house price equal to 15. The 
areas under the two distributions show the share of bidders whose reservation values 
are larger than 15. Figure 1 then shows how skewness adds higher bidders. In Figure 1, 
for any house price above (approximately) 7, a larger share of bidders from the more 
skewed distribution has reservation values that are larger than the house price.  
One reason that reservation values are likely to be skewed to the right is that 
distributions of individual incomes and wealth within most countries are skewed to the 
right.  The distribution of preferences is also very likely skewed rightward, as 
evidenced by some households’ being willing to spend far more of their incomes or 
wealth on houses in Hawaii than others are. Any skewness of preferences for houses in 
Hawaii, thereby, adds to the skewness of the distributions of reservation values that 
would arise from skewed income and wealth distributions.
7 
Shifts in the relative wealth of two countries change the probability for each 
country that the maximum (winning) bid for a house comes from that country. 
Separately, a widespread increase in the preferences or in the skewness of preferences in 
a country for houses in Hawaii would also increase the reservation values and resulting 
probabilities. 
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Shifting Wealth and Market Shares 
Figure 2 illustrates how the probability that the winning bid comes from country 
B rises as country B’s wealth rises. To highlight the effects of relative wealth on the 
calculated probabilities in Figure 2, we made reservation values for each individual in 
each country the same proportion of each individual’s wealth. We assume that wealth in 
Country A has a chi-squared distribution with a mean equal to 5, i.e., 
2(5) c .  To show 
how relative wealth affects the probabilities, and thus the market shares, we calculated 
the probability for a range of values of the mean of the chi-squared distribution of wealth 
in country B from 0.25 to 12. The population of the United States is about double that of 
Japan. The total numbers of actual and potential bidders for each house typically might 
be quite large. Therefore, Figure 2 presents the probabilities that would be implied by 100 
random draws from the wealth (and thus reservation value) distribution of Country A and 
50 random draws from the wealth distribution of Country B.
8  Figure 2 shows that, even 
when the means of the wealth distributions of the two countries A and B are equal to 5, 
having fewer bidders implies that the probability of the winning bid coming from 
Country B is noticeably less than 0.50. 
The probabilities of a winning bid coming from Country B trace out an S-shape as 
the wealth of Country B rises. The probabilities change most dramatically when the mean 
of Country B’s wealth, and thus its reservation values, is closer to Country A’s mean. If 
country B’s wealth rises enough relative to the A’s wealth, the probabilities of a bidder 
from B winning each house auction asymptotically approaches 1.00 (i.e., 100 percent).    13
Similarly, a country whose bidders had preferences for houses in Hawaii that 
strengthened over time would have increasingly large marginal effects on prices. 
The probabilities in Figure 2 also serve as estimates of st, the share of all houses 
sold to bidders from Country B. Thus, Figure 2 shows how considerably the share, which 
equation (8) shows determines the marginal effect of or coefficient on prices of a 
country’s wealth, rises over the range of its (relative) wealth. As Country B’s relative 
wealth ranges from nearly zero to over 10, Figure 2 shows that the probabilities, and thus 
st, rise from nearly zero to 100 percent, implying that the effects on prices of changes in 
Country B’s wealth range from nearly zero to being nearly the only factor that affects 
prices. 
Below we analyze an especially dramatic shift in coefficients. We analyze 
whether the shifts in the relative wealth of the U.S. and Japan have been large enough 
that the prices of houses in Hawaii acted as if they were determined completely by 
bidders from the U.S. for some years, but were completely determined by bidders from 
Japan for other years. We find evidence that house prices in Hawaii were better 
accounted for when we allowed for dramatic “regime shifts” of coefficients than when 
we specified constant (but different) coefficients on the wealth of the U.S. and Japan. 
 
III.  Hawaii Is Ideal 
 
Demand for Houses in Hawaii 
In many ways, the market for houses in Hawaii is an ideal setting for detecting 
regime shifts.  Located nearly in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, Hawaii is 2,500 miles   14
from the U.S. mainland and 3,800 miles from Tokyo, Japan. The climate, beaches, 
culture, scenery, and entertainment in Hawaii create strong demand for its houses. Two 
large, identifiable groups dominate the offshore demand for houses in Hawaii, the 
residents of Japan and the residents of the (mainland) United States. There is no 
significant source of offshore demand for houses in Hawaii that is nearer than the U.S. 
mainland or Japan. The per-capita incomes and wealth of the residents of Hawaii’s two 
closest and important neighbors, the mainland U.S. and Japan, were also two of the 
highest in the world.
9 Relative to the populations of the mainland U.S. and Japan, the 
number of houses available for sale in Hawaii is small. 
The demands of these two groups were not highly correlated in recent decades. 
Per-capita incomes and wealth in Japan and in the U.S. were all volatile but not highly 
correlated with that of the other country over the past three decades. Starting in about 
1986, land values and stock prices in Japan began to rise, as did the Japanese yen relative 
to the U.S. dollar. As a result, Japanese incomes and wealth (in U.S. dollars) rose 
suddenly and grew rapidly. With the collapse of its asset values and subpar GDP 
performance in the 1990s, however, Japan suffered a major reversal of fortune and 
endured a “lost decade” and more. The 1990s were strikingly different for the U.S.:  Real 
GDP grew rapidly, and, by the late 1990s, the U.S. had its own asset price boom, with 
enormous increases in (mainland) real estate and equity values. 
 
Supply of Houses in Hawaii 
The supply of houses in Hawaii is constrained by nature and by man. The price-
elasticity of the supply of houses in Hawaii is likely to be especially low for two reasons.    15
First, the mountains and the ocean severely limit the amount of potentially buildable land 
in this small U.S. state. Second, for historical reasons, a very large share of all land in 
Hawaii is held in public trust or owned by the public sector.
10 Consistent with strong 
demand and supply that is quite inelastic with respect to house prices, the median house 
price in Hawaii is about three times the median for the U.S. as a whole. 
The relatively inelastic supply of houses, coupled with the large magnitude, the 
volatility, and the low correlation of demands from the U.S. and Japan, suggest that house 
prices in Hawaii might respond strongly to U.S., but weakly to Japanese, demand before 
the years of the Japanese “bubble economy” and after its end. Conversely, prices might 
have been determined almost completely by demand from Japan during the years of the 
bubble economy. That is, there may have been regime shifts. 
 
Endogeneity of Local Demand for Houses 
Hawaiian residents own and buy more houses in Hawaii than the two large groups 
of offshore demanders do.
11 Thus we need to consider their role in the demand for houses 
in Hawaii. 
Hawaii is not only geographically distinct, but it is also economically distinct.  Of 
the 50 states, Hawaii’s economic activity is among the least correlated with aggregate 
U.S. economic activity. One reason for the lack of correlation is that the Hawaiian 
economy’s sectoral composition differs considerably from that of the mainland U.S. 
economy and from the economy of Japan. At the end of 2006, for example, the share of 
employment in manufacturing was less than 3 percent in Hawaii, while manufacturing 
accounted for 10 percent of total U.S. employment and 18 percent of total Japanese   16
employment. While 17 percent of Hawaiian employees worked in the leisure and 
hospitality sector, only 10 percent of U.S. employees and 5 percent of Japanese 
employees worked in that sector.
12 Although Hawaiian per-capita incomes were similar 
to those in the rest of the U.S. at about $35,000 in 2005, Hawaiian residents had 
homeownership rates in 2005 that were only about 60 percent, compared with 69 percent 
in the U.S. 
Thus, Hawaiian incomes and wealth are unusually dependent, directly and 
indirectly, on the leisure and hospitality sector. Stronger demand in that sector directly 
raises many Hawaiians’ incomes and wealth, which ripples generally across the Hawaiian 
economy and population. Therefore, we took the reservation values fueled by incomes 
and wealth, or demand, for houses by Hawaiian residents to be primarily determined 
endogenously by demand for the output of the leisure and hospitality sector, which in 
turn was driven primarily by visitors from Japan and the United States. Their visits and 
expenditures while there, in turn, were driven by the conditions in the distant, U.S. and 
Japanese economies. Because it was endogenous, local, Hawaiian demand for houses was 
incorporated into but did not appear directly in the reduced forms for house prices that we 
develop further below. 
 
Reverberations of Concentrated Demand 
Even if they were concentrated near the perimeter of the Hawaiian islands, 
offshore demands could affect, not just house prices on the perimeter but, the prices of 
many more houses in the geographically small state of Hawaii. The urban structure model 
of Capozza and Helsley (1990) shows that the house price-distance gradient reflects the   17
costs associated with physical distance. In the usual case, property prices decline 
monotonically with distance from an urban employment center. The Hawaiian analog to 
the urban center is perhaps the beach. Indeed, many very-high-priced houses are not near 
the urban center, but instead are near the perimeters of the islands. The houses that sit 
along a distance-to-the-beach gradient are imperfectly, but somewhat, substitutable. 
Given the inelastic supply of houses at any given distance from the beach, increased 
offshore demand for beachfront or any other houses in Hawaii would directly raise the 
prices of those houses. Those higher prices would then indirectly raise the prices of other, 
somewhat substitutable houses as the upward shock to perimeter prices reverberated 
along the price gradient.  
 
IV.  A Constant-Coefficient, Reduced-Form Model of House Prices 
Before we estimate a regime-shifting model in the next section, here we specify 
and then estimate a conventional model of house prices that implies reduced-form 
coefficients that are constant over time. The Peek-Wilcox (1991) model of the supply of 
and demand for houses is one example of a model that leads to reduced forms whose 
coefficients are constant over time. They assume that the supply of houses, Q
s, depends 
positively on the price of houses (P):    
(9)      0 1 .
S Q P j j = +        
When exogenous demand comes from the U.S. and Japan, the total demand for houses, 
Q
D, depends positively on the wealth of each country, W
JP and W
US, and negatively on the 
price of houses (P). The inverted demand function for houses can then be written as: 
(10)      0 1 2 3 .
US JP D P W W Q q q q q = + + -    18
Equating demand and supply and inserting (9) into (10) produces (11), the reduced form 
for the price of houses (P): 
(11)     
0 3 0 2 1
3 1 3 1 3 1
.
1 1 1
US JP P W W
q q j q q
q j q j q j
      -
= + +       + + +      
 
Since the supply and demand functions are linear and have parameters, the   's j
 and the   's b , that are constant, the reduced form for the price of houses, P, has constant 
coefficients. The reduced form in (11) can be rewritten in terms of constant reduced-form 
coefficients as equation (12):
13 
 (12)      0 1 2 .
US JP P W W g g g = + +  
 
V.  Data for House Prices and Demand 
In this section we describe the selection and construction of house price, wealth, 
income variables that we use to estimate reduced-form models of the prices of houses in 
Hawaii. 
 
House Prices in Hawaii, the United States, and in Japan 
Figure 3 shows indexes of house prices in real U.S. dollars for three places: 
Hawaii, the U.S., and Japan. For Hawaii and the U.S., we used the annual Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) nominal house price indexes.
14 We divided those 
nominal house prices by the consumer price index for Honolulu and for the U.S., 
respectively, to get the real price of houses in Hawaii and the U.S. There is no readily 
available nationwide measure for house prices in Japan for our long sample period.    19
We use prices of land and prices of structures to construct a price index for houses 
in Japan. First, we calculated an equally-weighted average of the prices of land in each 
prefecture.
15 Next, we assumed that the real price of structures in Japan was constant over 
our sample period. The more elastic is the supply curve for structures, the less that 
changes in demand for houses get capitalized in structure prices and the more that they 
get capitalized into the prices of less-elastically-supplied land. We scaled the indexes of 
land and structure prices so that the value of Japanese houses in 1976 consisted of equal 
values of land and of structures. Then, we added the scaled Japanese real land and real 
structure prices to form the index of real house (land plus structures) prices for Japan for 
the years 1976-2008. 
Changes in the real price of land, which rose and fell enormously over our sample 
period, shifted the share of total house values that were associated with land. Land’s 
shifting shares and structure’s constant real price over time meant that our real house 
price series for Japan was highly, but certainly not perfectly, correlated with real land 
prices. We multiplied the index of real house prices in Japan by the dollar/yen exchange 
rate to get the real, U.S. dollar value of Japanese house prices. 
Figure 3 shows that the (real, U.S. dollar) price of houses in Hawaii was quite 
highly correlated with prices of houses in the U.S. for most of our sample period.
16  That 
is not too surprising, since both would have been affected by common national factors, 
like interest rates, inflation, GDP, housing and tax policies, and financial policies (such as 
those of the GSEs). Notable, however, is the lower correlation between the prices of 
houses in the U.S. and in Hawaii from the late 1980s through the middle of the 1990s. 
The prices of houses in Hawaii appear to have more closely mimicked Japanese house   20
prices then. The price of houses in Hawaii rose sharply during the years of the Japanese 
bubble economy and then, after the bubble popped, fell significantly in the early 1990s, 
as did Japanese house prices. 
 
Wealth and Other Indicators of Demand for Houses in Hawaii 
Below we use indicators of demand from the U.S. and from Japan to help explain 
house prices in Hawaii. Among the indicators of demands for houses in Hawaii, we use 
the prices of houses in the U.S. and in Japan. In addition to reflecting measurable 
variables, such as incomes and wealth, that affect demand for houses in Hawaii, house 
prices in the U.S. and in Japan reflect other, often unmeasurable variables that affect the 
demand for houses, such as credit conditions, expectations about future economic 
conditions, and so on. Therefore, we use house prices in the U.S. and in Japan as one 
indicator for the U.S. and for the Japanese demand for houses in Hawaii.  
Figures 4 and 5 plot three, more-commonly-used indicators of demand for houses: 
stock prices, national net worth, and GDP. (Like house prices in Figure 3, each of these 
series are expressed in real U.S. dollars and are indexed to equal 100 in 1990.) In addition 
to showing results based on these indicators, we also use an indicator of demand that 
focuses on higher-income households: the product of national net worth and the share of 
total wages accruing to households in the top 0.1 percent of the income distribution.
17 
Those with very high incomes may comprise very many of those who bid for and buy 
houses in Hawaii. In addition and in contrast to national aggregates, this indicator 
captures the increasing skewness of the income and wealth distributions during our   21
sample period. As such, this indicator would better incorporate the effects of the more-
skewed distributions on the maximum bids and thus prices of houses in Hawaii.
18 
 
VI.  Estimates of the Constant-Coefficient Model 
In this section, we show the results of estimating the constant-coefficient, 
reduced-form model of house prices in Hawaii that we derived in Section IV. We use the 
results as a benchmark for the results of estimating models that allow for regime shifts. 
 
Estimated Elasticities 
Table 1 shows (OLS) estimates of constant-coefficient (reduced-form) models of 
the price of houses in Hawaii for 1975-2008. Each column shows the results of regressing 
the log of the real price of houses in Hawaii on indicators of demands from the U.S. and 
Japan, as measured by the logs of real U.S. and Japanese incomes and wealth. Column 1 
shows the large and significant estimated elasticities of house prices in Hawaii when we 
use real house prices in the U.S. and in Japan as indicators of demand. We estimated the 
elasticity of house prices in Hawaii to U.S. house prices to be 1.27; the estimated 
elasticity with respect to Japanese house prices was 0.33. Both of these coefficients were 
statistically significant.
19 
  The estimated price elasticities in Table 1 for the other indicators of demand are 
much smaller. The estimated elasticities with respect to stock prices were a significant 
0.22 and an insignificant 0.21, respectively, for the U.S. and for Japan (column 2). The 
estimated U.S. and Japanese price elasticities of net worth (column 3) were a significant 
0.44 and an insignificant 0.18, respectively. Column 5 shows the estimated elasticities   22
with respect to the indicator of demand by higher-income households, which was 
constructed as the product of net worth and the share of incomes that accrued to the top 
0.1 percent of the distribution of household incomes. In contrast to the other estimates in 
Table 1, and perhaps surprisingly, the estimated U.S. elasticity was small and 
insignificant (and even slightly negative). The estimated Japanese elasticity for the high-
income indicator was quite large (0.45), significant, and larger than for any of the other 
Japanese indicators. 
 
Unit Roots, Statistical Significance, and Cointegration 
Because the incomes and wealth of these two countries tended to rise over time, 
we also expected house prices in Hawaii to have risen over time. Trends raise issues that 
are associated with unit roots and cointegration. 
We could not reject the hypothesis of a unit root for any of the data series that we 
use in the estimated reduced forms for house prices in Table1. As a consequence, the t-
statistics and p-values that are calculated in the standard way do not follow their standard 
distributions. 
Trends in the variables that we use for Table 1 raise concern that they might be 
spuriously correlated. To allay that concern, we test whether house prices in Hawaii are 
cointegrated, rather than spuriously correlated, with wealth and other indicators of U.S. 
and Japanese demand. The p-values for the Phillips-Perron tests for unit roots in the 
residuals, shown in the bottom row of Table 1, never exceeded 0.05. Those p-values 
imply that we can reject the hypothesis of no cointegration for each of the five 
specifications in Table 1.   23
Since statistical tests reject that the three variables in each regression were not 
cointegrated, we conclude that the reduced-form coefficients were estimated consistently. 
Relying on those consistent estimates, we then report “significance” that is based on the 
ratio of the estimated coefficients relative to their standard errors and that makes some 
allowance for those ratios not following standard t-distributions. Often, regression tables 
denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (or better) by attaching 1, 
2, or 3 asterisks to the estimated coefficients. Typically, those levels correspond to 
calculated t-statistics of 1.64, 1.96, or 2.32 (or more in absolute value). 
To allow for the nonstandard distributions of the ratios of estimated coefficients to 
standard errors, we attached an asterisk to each estimated coefficient in each regression 
table, Tables 1 – 5, according to the following rule: For ratios that exceeded 3, 4, or 5, 
respectively, we attached 1, 2, or 3 asterisks. In effect, that means that we attached a 
number of asterisks that corresponded to ratios that were at least double the usual 
minimums of 1.64, 1.96, and 2.32. Thus, we use “significant” to refer to coefficients that 
had ratios of at least 4, about double the critical value for a standard t-statistic at a 
significance level of .05. 
Despite accepting cointegration, the OLS residuals from the reduced-form 
estimates in Table 1 were highly autocorrelated. The diagnostic statistics for the 
residuals, which are shown in the bottom rows of Table 1, show that each of the demand 
indicators produced a first-order autocorrelation coefficient for the residuals that was at 
least 0.70. Highly autocorrelated residuals are often a signal of some kind of mis-
specification, perhaps of functional form, of omitted variables, or of time-varying 
coefficients.   24
 
VII.  Time-Varying Coefficients 
Our auction-based model of house prices implies that fluctuations over time in the 
relative wealth of nations can lead to large fluctuations in the effects, or coefficients, of 
U.S. and Japanese demand on the prices for houses in Hawaii. 
Figures 4 and 5 show that there have been large shifts in the incomes and wealth 
in Japan relative to those in the United States. Japanese (relative) wealth rose sharply 
after the middle of the 1980s and fell sharply in the 1990s, when the Japanese economy 
stagnated and the U.S. economy flourished. Figure 3 shows that house prices in Japan 
relative to those in the U.S. also rose during the late 1980s and then sagged during the 
1990s. Our auction-based model suggests then that the elasticities of house prices in 
Hawaii with respect to demand from the U.S. and from Japan might shift considerably, 
and in opposite directions, over the 1980s and 1990s. After the middle of the 1980s, when 
Japanese wealth was relatively higher, so too should have been the estimated elasticities 
of house prices in Hawaii with respect to Japanese demand; then after Japanese fortunes 
reversed dramatically during the 1990s, so too should have the coefficients of U.S. and of 
Japanese demand on house prices in Hawaii.  
Figure 3 shows that house prices in Hawaii were, indeed, strongly correlated with 
Japanese demand (for example, as indicated by Japanese house prices) for about a decade 
beginning in the middle of the 1980s. Other than for that period, however, those two 
series seem much less correlated. Instead, house prices in Hawaii, both before and after 
the Japanese decade of dominance, quite clearly were much more correlated with U.S. 
demand (as indicated by the price of houses in the U.S.). Thus, house prices in Hawaii   25
tended to be highly correlated with the wealth of a country only when that country was 
relatively wealthier. 
 
Estimates for Subperiods 
  To analyze whether the effects on house prices of its demand changed with each 
country’s fortunes, we applied the constant-coefficient specification that we used for 
column 1 of Table 1 to data for several subperiods. For ease of comparison, we repeat in 
column 1 of Table 2 the full-sample results in column 1 of Table 1. 
To see if the elasticities of house prices in Hawaii with respect to demand did 
shift importantly over time, we estimated the column 1 specification for each of three 
subperiods. The results are shown in columns 2-4. Column 2 shows that the elasticity 
with respect to U.S. demand, though insignificant, was much larger than that for Japan 
(0.69 vs. 0.12) during 1975-1985, when U.S. incomes and wealth were relatively higher. 
In the 1986-1996 subperiod, when Japanese wealth was relatively larger, the 
estimated coefficient on Japanese demand is large (0.75) and significant, while the 
estimated U.S. coefficient was insignificant, negative, and large. After the middle of the 
1990s, the reversal of Japanese fortunes was matched by a reversal of coefficients. 
Column 4 shows the estimates for the 1997-2008 subperiod.  Then, the estimated U.S. 
demand elasticity soared to 1.94, while the Japanese elasticity declined somewhat and 
was no longer significant. The negative correlation over time of the estimated U.S. and 
Japanese elasticities and the negative correlation of the estimated U.S. elasticity with the 
relative wealth of Japan are what our model predicts.   26
  Shifts in two countries’ coefficients that are sufficiently abrupt, large, and 
negatively correlated can be regarded as regime shifts. Table 3 in the next section 
presents the results of estimating specifications that allow for regime shifts. The estimates 
in column 1 of Table 3 imply that house prices in Hawaii were in a “Japanese regime” 
from 1987 through 2000. All of the other years in our 1975-2008 sample period were 
estimated to be in a regime where house prices were determined solely by U.S. demand.  
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 report the results of estimating a constant-coefficient 
model separately for the years of the U.S. regime (1975-1986 plus 2001-2008) and for the 
years of the Japanese regime (1987-2000). (The regimes are implied by the estimates in 
column 1 of Table 3. We fully discuss Table 3 below.)  Column 5 shows that the 
estimated coefficient for Japanese demand was large (0.70) and significant, while the 
U.S. demand coefficient was negative and insignificant. The coefficient pattern was 
reversed when fortunes were reversed. During the years when the U.S. was relatively 
wealthier, the estimated coefficient on U.S. demand was very large (2.05) and significant, 
while the estimated Japanese coefficient was virtually zero and insignificant.  
 
VIII.  A Regime-Shifting Model of the Price of Houses in Hawaii 
Our model implies that market shares and thus coefficients vary continuously 
with relative demand. Throughout, we assume that the country-specific demand 
coefficients (i.e., the  's a  above), as opposed to the weights, are constant. Sufficiently 
large increases of a country’s incomes and wealth and thus demand, however, can boost 
market share, st, and thus the weight on that country’s demand in determining prices 
enough that the weight can be approximated as having risen from zero to one. In our   27
context, the regime-shifting model puts a weight of zero on demand from one country at 
the same time that it puts a weight of one on demand from the other country. As such, 
regime shifting is an extreme version of time-varying weights. 
Next we develop a regime-shifting model, which allows for extreme shifts in the 
effects on house prices in Hawaii of U.S. and Japanese demands. In equation (8), the 
average of house prices at any time t are determined by a share-weighted average of the 
maximum bids from the U.S. and from Japan. In contrast, the regime-shifting model 
requires that prices are determined by the maximum bids from the U.S. or from Japan, 
but not both.
20 Thus, the weight on U.S. demand at any time t is either zero or one. When 
the U.S. weight is zero, the Japanese weight is one, and vice versa. As before, suppose 
that the expected maximum bid from each country is linear function of the wealth of that 
country and that there is a disturbance term for each country. The average price of houses 
sold, Pt, in the regime-shifting model then is: 
 (13)      0 1 0 1 max , ,
US US US US JP JP JP JP
t t t t t P W W a a e a a e   = + + + +    
where the disturbance terms are distributed as  (0, )
US US
t N v e ∼  and  (0, )
JP JP
t N v e ∼ .   
Denote the probability that the highest bids come from the U.S. and thus the 
probability that house prices equal the reservation values of U.S. bidders: 
 (14)      ( ) 0 1 0 1 Pr .
US JP JP JP JP US US US
t t t t t W W l e e a a a a = - > + - -  
  We denote the maximum bid from each country by  t B .  The joint distribution of 
U.S. and Japanese bids is  ( , )
US JP
t t g B B . When the average price is determined by U.S. 
bids, then the conditional probability of Pt is: 
(15)      ( ) 0 ( | ) ( ,  ) / .
t P US US JP JP
t t t t t t t h P P B g B B dB l = = ∫    28
When Pt is determined by Japanese bids, the conditional distribution of Pt is: 
 (16)      ( ) 0 ( | ) ( ,  ) / (1 ).
t P JP US JP US
t t t t t t t h P P B g B B dB l = = - ∫  
Then the unconditional distribution of Pt is:  
(17)      ( ) ( | ) (1 ) ( | ).
US JP
t t t t t t t t t h P h P P B h P P B l l = = + - =  
The likelihood  function for  t P  is:  
(18)      ( ) t
t
L h P =Õ . 
We can estimate the elasticities of house prices in Hawaii with respect to wealth 
in the U.S. and in Japan by maximum likelihood. The method also estimates the 
probabilities, t l , that Pt was determined by U.S. bids and estimates for the U.S. and for 
Japan the variance, v, of its disturbance term, 
US
t e  and 
JP
t e . The method allows the data to 
choose the number of regimes that maximize the likelihood function.  A U.S. regime is 
defined as any year when U.S. rather than Japanese bids determined Pt. 
 
Estimates of the Regime-Shifting Model 
Table 3 shows estimates of the regime-shifting model. The estimates in each 
column use the same indicators of demand as the columns in Tables 1 and 2. The size and 
significance of the estimated elasticities of the U.S. demand indicators differ greatly in 
Table 3 from the estimates in Table 1. The regime-shifting coefficients are generally 
much larger and much more statistically significant. For example, The estimated value of 
the elasticity of house prices in Hawaii with respect to U.S. net worth rose enormously, 
from an insignificant 0.60 in Table 1 to become large (2.46) and very significant. 
Compared with the constant-coefficient results in Table 1, Table 3 also shows that the   29
estimated coefficients in the regime-shifting model for the indicators of Japanese demand 
have tend to be much larger and much more significant. And, in a sign that allowing for 
regime shifts may have reduced mis-specification, the residuals in Table 3 are generally 
less autocorrelated than those based on the constant-coefficient specifications. As 
evidenced by the generally higher R
2’s in Table 3, the regime-shifting model generally 
outperforms the constant-coefficient model. 
Figure 6 plots the (log of the real) price of houses in Hawaii and the prices that 
the estimated coefficients in column 1 of Table 3 and the indicators of U.S. and Japanese 
demands imply for 1975-2008. Figure 6 shows that estimated U.S. demand clearly 
exceeded demand from Japan until the mid-1980s. As the 1980s proceeded, the large 
appreciation of the yen, the onset of the bubble economy in Japan, and the tepid 
performance of the U.S. economy combined to raise Japanese demand above that of the 
U.S. The latter 1980s is the time when contemporaneous accounts noted the surge in 
Japanese tourism and home purchases in Hawaii. Miller, Sklarz, and Ordway (1988) 
document that the Japanese share of house purchases (including those by Hawaiians) rose 
dramatically during this period. The Japanese share of houses purchased by offshore 
buyers then rose even more dramatically. Figure 6 also shows that, even though Japanese 
demand declined through most of the 1990s, it still exceeded U.S. demand until 1998.  
Not until estimated U.S. demand rose in the prosperous, latter 1990s was the market for 
houses in Hawaii estimated to be in a U.S. regime, where it remained through the end of 
our sample period in 2008. 
Figure 7 shows that the estimated probability, lt, of being in a U.S. regime 
remained at nearly 100 percent into the middle of the 1980s. That probability then   30
plummeted in the latter 1980s to near zero and stayed there through 1997. After that, the 
continuing stagnation of Japanese incomes and wealth, coupled with the resurgence of 
U.S. demand, raised the probability of being in a U.S. regime to nearly 100 percent. Thus, 
estimates in column 1 of Table 3 of the regime-shifting model suggest that U.S. demand 
held sway in Hawaii, except for the notable period of about a decade beginning in the 
latter 1980s. 
 
Additional Evidence Regarding Regime Shifts 
  The relative numbers of visitors from the U.S. and Japan to Hawaii by airlines 
corroborate the boom and bust of Japanese demand for the output, presumably including 
services of houses, of Hawaii. For the period 1990-2008 when data are available, Figure 
8 plots the ratio of the number of visitors from Japan to those from the U.S.  The ratio 
was high during the years that the regime-shifting model estimates that house prices were 
in the Japanese regime.  More interesting, perhaps, is that the ratio of Japanese to U.S. 
visitors continued to grow even as our indicators of Japanese demand were weakening.   
   Table 4 uses a Davidson-MacKinnon test to directly compare the performance of 
the constant-coefficient with the regime-shifting model. We regressed house prices in 
Hawaii on the prices implied by the constant-coefficient model and on the prices implied 
by the regime-shifting model. The implied prices are the fitted values from the 
regressions that we report in column 1 of Table 1 and in column 1 of Table 3. The fitted 
values are constructed as the higher of the implied U.S. and Japanese demands for each 
year. Table 4 suggests that the regime-shifting model outperformed the constant-
coefficient model by a wide margin. The estimated coefficient on the prices implied by   31
the regime-shifting model was strongly significant and nearly one (0.97). In contrast, the 
estimated coefficient on the prices implied by the constant-coefficient model was not 
close to being significant and was much smaller (0.33). Thus, the regime-shifting 
estimates much more closely tracked prices than the constant-coefficient estimates did. 
Table 5 provides additional evidence about the performance of the regime-shifting 
model. In the auction-based model, the demand from the lower-demand country would 
not be expected to affect prices; only the demand of the higher bidders should affect 
prices. Table 5 shows the results of our regressing house prices in Hawaii on two 
variables. The first variable, labeled as demand from the higher-demand country in row 2 
of Table 5, again consisted of the fitted values from the regression that we report in 
column 1 of Table 3. The second variable, labeled as demand from the lower-demand 
country in row 3 of Table 5, was constructed as the lower of the implied U.S. and 
Japanese demands for year. Row 2 shows that the coefficient on the demand from the 
higher demand country was 0.98 and was clearly significant. In contrast, demand from 
the lower demand country had no detectable effect on house prices; its coefficient was 
near zero (0.02) and insignificant. Thus, the upper envelope of demands strongly affected 
prices, while the lower envelope did not. 
The specifications in Tables 1 and 3 generally passed standard cointegration tests. 
That suggests that those regression results were not likely to be spurious. Using first-
differenced data is another way to allay concerns about spurious regressions.  
Differencing is typically appropriate for constant-coefficient models. Unfortunately, 
using first-differenced data is not appropriate for our regime-shifting model, where 
coefficients shift abruptly. Knowing which country had the larger difference in demand   32
cannot alone tell us which country had the higher level of demand. And, it is the higher 
level of demand that determines prices. Stated differently, at regime shifts it is not the 
changes in demand from either country that determines the amounts that prices change, 
but rather price changes at regime shifts are determined by the difference between the 
prices implied by the demand from the country whose regime is ending and the prices 
implied by the demand from the country whose regime is beginning. Thus, when there 
are regime shifts, first differences of prices will not be consistently related to first 
differences of the demands from the two countries.  
To make some progress in this area, however, we proceeded as follows. First, we 
first-differenced the data for house prices in Hawaii, in the U.S., and in Japan. Then, we 
used the estimates in column 1 of Table 3 to generate the levels of fitted values of house 
prices in Hawaii. The fitted values include values for the years of regime shifts. We then 
regressed the first-differences of house prices in Hawaii on three variables: the first 
differences of U.S. house prices, the first-differences of Japanese house prices, and the 
first-differences of the fitted values that were based on the regime-shift estimates. The 
estimated coefficients (and standard errors of the coefficients in parentheses below) of 
that regression are: 
(19)  
0.01 0.179 0.146 0.799 Fitted Values
        (0.02)   (0.67)          (0.16)           (0.30)
US JP
t t t P P P D = + D - D + D
  
  Equation (19) shows that the first-differences of house prices in Hawaii were 
significantly related to the first-differences in the fitted values from the regime-shifting 
model, but not significantly related to the first differences of house prices in the U.S. or 
in Japan. The strong significance of the first-differenced fitted values adds to our 
confidence that the regime-shift results that were based on the undifferenced data were   33
not spurious. In addition, the results in equation (13) can be regarded as a first-difference 
variant of a Davidson-MacKinnon test in that it shows that the regime-shift-based fitted 
values outperformed the differenced indicators of U.S. and Japanese demand. 
 
IX.  Summary and Implications of Regime Shifts 
We model house prices as the outcomes of auctions. Prices then reflect the 
demands of the winning bidders and not the demands of the lower bidders. A sufficiently 
large increase in the relative incomes or wealth of the group of lower bidders can raise 
their demands enough that they become the higher-bidding group and, thus, determine 
house prices. This is a regime shift. While in a regime, prices reflect the demand, and 
thus the elasticities and volatilities of the measured and of the unmeasured sources of 
demand, only of the higher-bidding group.  
We present evidence that house prices in Hawaii were better accounted for by a 
regime-shifting model. Both the constant-coefficient and the regime-shifting models 
provided empirically plausible explanations of house prices in Hawaii. But, by various 
metrics, the regime-shifting model significantly outperformed the constant-coefficient 
model. 
The estimates of our regime-shifting model imply that prices responded 
significantly and only to U.S. demand for most years from 1975 through 2008.  However, 
from the middle of the 1980s into the latter 1990s, the regime-shifting estimates imply 
that the prices of houses Hawaii reflected only Japanese demand. 
Shifts from one regime to another imply that the elasticities of the price of houses 
in Hawaii with respect to U.S. demand and to Japanese demand change dramatically then.   34
Until the end of the regime, the elasticity of prices with respect to demand from the 
“lower-demand” country is implied to be zero. When it becomes the “higher-demand” 
country, we are in a new regime and the effects on prices of that country’s demand then 
will have full force. Thus, regime shifting offers one explanation for systematically time-
varying coefficients and volatilities. 
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Figure 1 





Note: The figure plots two chi-square distributions of reservation values for a particular 
house. One distribution has a mean of 5 (solid line) and the other one has a mean of 7 
(dashed line). The area that is under each distribution and is to the right of the vertical 
line drawn at a house price of 15 indicates the share of potential buyers whose reservation 
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Figure 2  







Note: The figure shows the probabilities that a bidder from Country B wins an auction for 
a house. We consider bidders from each of two countries, A and B. Each bidder from 
each country is assumed to make a bid that is proportional to the bidder’s wealth. Each 
probability is based on 100 bids from Country A and 50 bids from Country B. The bids 
are based on random draws from the wealth distribution of each country. We assumed 
that wealth in Country A was distributed as chi-square with a mean of 5. Wealth in 
Country B is also distributed as chi-square.  The probabilities that the winning bidder was 
from Country B rise as the mean of the chi-square distribution of Country B’s wealth 
rises from 0.25 to 12.  
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Figure 3 





Note: Indexes of real house prices in Hawaii, the United States, and Japan in U.S. dollars. 



















Note: Indexes of real stock prices (S&P500), real GDP (GDP), and real household net 
worth (Household Net Worth) for the United States in U.S. dollars.  Each index was 
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Figure 5 




Note: Indexes of real stock prices (Nikkei 300), real GDP (GDP), and real household net 
worth (Household Net Worth) for Japan in U.S. dollars. Each index was based to equal 
100 in 1990. 
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Figure 6 







Note:  All series are logs of real house prices in Hawaii. The dashed line shows the house 
prices that are implied by U.S. demand and the estimates in column 1 of Table 3. The 
dashed-dotted line shows the house prices that are implied by Japanese demand and the 
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Figure 7 





Note:  The solid line plots the probability that U.S. demand exceeds Japanese demand 
and thus that house prices were determined by U.S. demand. The probability is implied 
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Source: Hawaiian Department of Tourism, http://hawaii.gov/dbedt/info/visitor-stats  44
 
 
All variables are annual and are expressed in logs of real, U.S. dollars. The sample period is 1975-2008.  The 
dependent variable in each column is the log of real house prices in Hawaii.  Each regression is estimated by OLS. 






1 2 3 4 5
 1. Constant       -2.88*        2.43***        1.58** 0.57        4.36***
(0.74) (0.29) (0.37) (0.73) (0.11)
U.S. Demand Indicators
 2. House Prices        1.27***
(0.17)
 3. Stock Prices        0.22*
(0.07)
 4. Net Worth        0.44*
(0.13)
 5. GDP        0.60
(0.26)
 6. Net Worth x High Income Share       -0.09
(0.09)
Japan Demand Indicators
 7. House Prices        0.33***
(0.05)
 8. Stock Prices 0.21
(0.08)








0.84 0.59 0.71 0.71 0.76
Sum of squared residuals 0.48 1.19 .86 0.86 0.46
Log likelihood 24.2 8.79 14.4 14.3 21.4
Residual diagnostics
   First-order autocorrelation coefficient        0.70***        0.87***        0.83***        0.80***        0.71**
(0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.17)
   p-value for Phillips-Perron unit root test 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05
Table 1
Price of Houses in Hawaii: Constant-Coefficient Models  45
 
 
All variables are annual and are expressed in logs of real, U.S. dollars. .  The dependent variable in each column is the 
log of real house prices in Hawaii.  Each regression is estimated by OLS. Standard errors are in parentheses.  Asterisks 
indicate ratios of estimated coefficients to their standard errors: >3(*), >4(**), >5(***). 
 
1975-2008 1975-1985 1986-1996 1997-2008 1987-2000
1975-1986, 
2001-2008
1 2 3 4 5 6
Constant -2.88* .52 15.0* -6.91 7.12 -5.24***
(0.74) (2.38) (4.79) (2.69) (4.22) (0.78)
U.S. Demand Indicator
 House Prices 1.27*** 0.69 -3.03 1.94*** -1.25 2.05***
(0.17) (0.55) (1.03) (0.24) (0.82) (0.23)
Japan Demand Indicator
 House Prices 0.33*** 0.12 0.75*** 0.53 0.70** 0.00
(0.05) (0.17) (0.09) (0.46) (0.16) (0.10)
R
2
0.84 0.27 0.91 0.90 0.79 0.95
Sum of squared residuals 0.48 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.12
Log likelihood 24.2 14.3 16.2 13.0 17.5 22.8
Table 2
Price of Houses in Hawaii: Constant-Coefficient Models
 (Subperiods)  46
 
All variables are annual and are expressed in logs of real, U.S. dollars.  The sample period is 1975-2008.  The 
dependent variable in each column is the log of real house prices in Hawaii. All regime-shifting regressions are 
estimated by maximum likelihood. Standard errors are in parentheses.  Asterisks indicate ratios of estimated 
coefficients to their standard errors: >3(*), >4(**), >5(***). 
1 2 3 4 5
U.S. Demand Indicators
 1. Constant       -5.21*** 3.09       -8.11*       -16.3**       3.96***
(0.61) (2.00) (2.17) (3.38) (0.02)
 2. House Prices        2.04***
(0.13)
 3. Stock Prices 0.21
(0.49)
 4. Net Worth        2.46***
(0.42)
 5. GDP        4.23***
(0.68)
 6. House Price x High Income Share        0.15***
(0.03)
 7. S.E.E. (s)        0.08** 0.00        0.08        0.05        0.04**
(0.02) (0.15) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01)
Japan Demand Indicators
 8. Constant 0.24        2.76**        2.83***        2.60*** 4.17***
(0.92) (0.68) (0.26) (0.35) (0.05)
 9. House Price        0.95**
(0.21)
10. Stock Prices        0.39
(0.15)
11. Net Worth        0.35***
(0.06)
12. GDP        0.38**
(0.08)
13. House Price x High Income Share        0.46***
(0.07)
14. S.E.E. (s)        0.08**        0.23***        0.12***        0.12*** 0.16**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
R
2
0.93 0.46 0.87 0.86 0.77
Sum of squared residuals 0.20 1.58 0.39 0.41 0.44
Log likelihood 39.1 23.8 27.2 30.0 28.3
Residual diagnostics
   First-order autocorrelation coefficient 0.41        0.91***        0.59*        0.65** 0.73
(0.17) (0.11) (0.15) (0.14) (0.15)
   p-value for Phillips-Perron unit root test 0.01 0.62 0.05 0.08 0.16
Table 3
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The table contains the result of a regression of the log of real house prices in Hawaii on the fitted values 
from the constant-coefficient model (column (1) of table 1) and the regime-shifting model (column (1) of 
table 3).  Both the constant-coefficient and the regime-shifting model estimates used the logs of real U.S. 
and Japanese house prices in U.S. dollars as explanatory variables. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Asterisks indicate ratios of estimated coefficients to their standard errors: >3(*), >4(**), and >5(***). 
 
   




   2. Constant-coefficient model             0.03
(0.16)




Sum of squared residuals 0.20
Log likelihood 39.0
Table 4
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The table contains the result of a regression of the log of real house prices in Hawaii on the fitted values 
from the regime-shifting model (column 1 of table 3) for the higher-demand country and for the lower-
demand country.  The demand indicators used as explanatory variables in the regime-shifting model 
estimates are the logs of real U.S. and Japanese house prices in U.S. dollars.  Standard errors are in 











   




   2. Higher-Demand Country                          0.98***
(0.07)




Sum of squared residuals 0.20
Log likelihood 39.0
Table 5
Effects of Demand from the Higher-Demand Country 




                                                 
1 See, for example, Lindsey (1988). 
 
2 Our discussion, model, and empirical analysis consider only two groups. In principle, regimes might shift 
among many groups. We considered but ruled out the possibility of a Canadian regime because, through 
the end of our sample period in 2008, Canadians made very few visits to Hawaii relative to visitors from 
the mainland U.S. or Japan. 
 
3 See Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010). 
 
4In practice, the selling process for houses may be more akin to ascending bid auctions. 
 
5 Based on their expectations for Pit, sellers may declare (nonbinding) listing prices for their houses before 
the auctions take place. Listing prices may typically and deliberately be set above the prices that sellers 
expect to receive. 
 
6 We expect that et would average zero over enough time periods. At any given time t, however, even 
though it is averaged over I houses sold, there is no reason to expect et to be zero in each period. 
 
7 Including idiosyncratic preferences for houses in Hawaii reduces the odds that only the wealthiest 
households buy houses in Hawaii. Some of the wealthiest households, for example, may not much value a 
house in Hawaii. Some of them also likely prefer consumption that does not require such high costs of 
travel time. 
 
8 We take the realized frequencies from 1000 replications of 150 draws for each level of wealth in Country 
B as estimates of the probabilities. 
 
9 Henceforth we will refer to the mainland United States as simply “the United States.” 
 
10 According to Hintz (1999), 42 percent of the land is owned by federal, state, or city governments.  An 
additional 47 percent is owned by a few individuals. 
 
11 Based on population of a little over one million, in Hawaii, its homeownership rate, and the number of 
houses, we can estimate the share of houses that are owned by Hawaiian residents. Miller, Sklarz, and 
Ordway (1988) estimated that, at the peak of Japanese demand, Japanese buyers accounted for about 30 
percent of total sales of houses in Hawaii in 1989. 
 
12 The U.S. and Hawaiian statistics are from December 2006, using the 2005 benchmark.  The Japanese 
labor statistics are from 2005 (http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/figures/index.htm#o).  The estimates for 
employment in the Japanese leisure and hospitality sector are from employment in the “eating and drinking 
places, and accommodations” sectors. 
 
13 The linearity of the reduced form here does not depend on whether the variables are expressed in levels 
or logs or other transformations. Below we specify house prices and wealth in logs. A constant-coefficient 
reduced form here does require that the same transformation (e.g., linear, log, etc.) be applied the quantity 
of houses in the supply and demand functions. 
 
14 We made one adjustment to the data for Hawaii, viz., for 1981.   The year 1981 had unusually high 
interest and unemployment rates. Nevertheless, we judged the decline of over 50 percent in the nominal 
price of houses in Hawaii in the FHFA’s repeat-sales price index for 1981 to be too large. Therefore we 
raised the 1981 value to a level that was halfway between the recorded level (30) and the average (60) of   50
                                                                                                                                                 
the values of the adjacent years 1980 (70) and 1982 (50); that is, we raised the nominal level from 30 to 45. 
In real terms, even this upward-adjusted price fell by well over 40 percent in 1981. 
 
15 We used data for land prices by prefecture by year from Research on Land Prices by the Prefectural 
Governments. The data are available online at http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/1431-17.htm. 
 
16 We also estimated specifications that related house prices in Hawaii to house prices in California. 
California easily accounts for the largest share of visitors to Hawaii from the U.S. The results that were 
based on California house prices were qualitatively similar to those that were based on U.S. house prices. 
However, California house prices did not explain house prices in Hawaii as well as U.S. house prices did. 
 
17 The data for income shares were calculated by Moriguchi and Saez (2008). We downloaded the data 
from http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/. 
 
18 See Goetzmann, Renneboog, and Spaeniers (2009). 
 
19 We discuss our criteria for statistical significance in more detail below. 
 
20 This basic framework was originally used to estimate supply and demand in markets that can be in 
“disequilibrium,” where the observed quantity is the minimum of the amounts supplied and demanded. See 
Fair and Jaffee (1972). Our summary of the estimation methodology borrows extensively from Maddala 
(1986).  
 